The wage-productivity nexus in the world factory economy by Dosi, Giovanni et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Wage-Productivity Nexus in the World 
Factory Economy 
 
Giovanni Dosi, Maria Enrica Virgillito, 
 and Xiaodan Yu 
 
  
Faculty of Business, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, 199 Taikang 
East Road, Ningbo, 315100, Zhejiang, China. 
 
First published 2020 
 
This work is made available under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0   
 
The work is licenced to the University of Nottingham Ningbo China 
under the Global University Publication Licence: 
https://www.nottingham.edu.cn/en/library/documents/research-
support/global-university-publications-licence.pdf 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Wage-Productivity Nexus in the World Factory Economy
Giovanni Dosi*†, Maria Enrica Virgillito‡,†, and Xiaodan Yu†,¶
†Institute of Economics, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, Italy
‡Department of Economic Policy, Universita’ Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy
¶Nottingham University Business School China, University of Nottingham Ningbo, China
Abstract
This paper highlights new findings on the wage-productivity nexus in the World Factory Econ-
omy. After presenting the long-run macro-elasticity characterizing the phase of Chinese economic
development since the eighties, we look at the wage-productivity nexus from a micro level perspec-
tive using a detailed firm-level dataset covering the period of ownership restructuring (1998-2007).
A few results are quite robust under different estimation strategies. First, throughout the impres-
sive Chinese economic miracle, elasticities of real wages to productivities – that is the ratios of rates
of variations of the former to the latter – are always positive both under pooled and longitudinal es-
timates, both at firm- and sectoral-levels. Second, such elasticities are dramatically low, and falling
in many distinct phases since the late seventies. That is, even in the manufacturing sector, the dis-
tribution of gains from the impressive labour productivity growth appears to be markedly uneven.
Finally, third, governance institutions seem to matter a lot, with the majority of ownership types ex-
hibiting firm-specific wage determination processes. The low elasticities of wages to productivity
are plausibly the consequence of the massive flow of migrant workers from the rural areas to the
coasts, somewhat resembling the early phase of the English Industrial Revolution with the pattern
of enclosure in the country-side and massive migrations to the industrial towns.
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1. Introduction
This work studies the microeconomic dynamics of wages and productivity, and their relationship in
Chinese manufacturing firms over the decade preceding the Great Recession. As known, increasing
evidence suggests that in the industrialized West labour productivity has slowed down (Syverson,
2017), while its dispersion has increased (Dunne et al., 2004). As so did wages, which in some coun-
tries like U.S. remained nearly stagnant on average, but under increasing degrees of dispersion (Barth
et al., 2016). OECD supporting findings on the double divide are in Berlingieri et al. (2017), espe-
cially for the service sector and especially concerning the bottom-part of the distributions of wage and
productivity (50 − 10 percentiles). In fact, in the “glorious decade” after WWII in the industrialized
West, wages were fully indexed on productivity, often at sectoral or even national levels. However,
more recently such indexation (so called degree of “pass-through”) has generally fallen and moved to
the firm-level (Schwellnus et al., 2017). Confirmatory evidence for the U.S. is reported by Stansbury
and Summers (2017) who find elasticities ranging between [0.4 − 0.7] according to estimations based
on average, median and production-non supervisory wages, with the latter having the lowest degree
of pass-through. In UK as well the median wage has suffered more from the wedge than the aver-
age wage (Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2013). In a complementary analysis, Card et al. (2018) show very
low elasticities even at the micro-level. Structural causes such as the increasing flexibility of labour
markets (Mergulhão and Pereira, 2019, with a firm-level analysis for Portugal), the widening gap be-
tween median and average wage and the declining labour share are considered the best candidates
to explain such divergences, more than the purported impact exerted by technological change. To the
best of our knowledge, evidence on developing countries is very scant, exceptions being Bhattacharya
et al. (2011) for Indian manufacturing firms, which however look at the effects of wages on labour
productivity; Wakeford (2004) for South Africa and Katovich and Maia (2018) for Brazil. According to
the latter studies, the elasticity in developing countries appears to be consistently lower than the one
reported for developed ones, in the range between [0.1− 0.3].
What happened in China? Here, against the foregoing tendencies, we shall examine the charac-
teristics of the wage-productivity nexus in the World Factory Economy. While the patterns of pro-
ductivity growth and convergence for the Chinese manufacturing sectors have been addressed in the
literature (see, among others, Author A), less attention has been devoted to the analysis of the distri-
bution of the latter impressive technological gains to wages. This is precisely what we shall do in the
following. Using a detailed firm-level dataset which includes all industrial firms above some mini-
mal scale threshold over the period 1998-2007, distinguishing also the ownership types of the firms
(e.g., State-owned, foreign MNCs, private-owned, etc.), we investigate the inter-sectoral and inter-
institutional heterogeneity in both wage and productivity distributions and the coupled dynamics of
the two latter variables, both in level and growth rates.
First of all we document an overall process of convergence in both variables, even if more marked
in productivity, and above all driven by the bottom part of the distributions (50-10 percentile ratio).
When decomposing variance in terms of within and between sectoral variations, in both cases the
within-sectoral (between-firms) component accounts for more than 80% of the total variation. In that,
however, while the dispersion in productivity shrinks, the wage one remains nearly stable during the
period under study.
In order to explore the link between wage and productivity we perform quantile regression esti-
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mates in levels and growth rates for the mean, as well as for the second moment. Interestingly, the
relationship between wage and productivity substantially varies conditional on the ownership type,
with Hong Kong/Macao/Taiwan-invested enterprises (HMTs), foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs),
and domestic private owned enterprises (POEs), positively contributing to an increasing wage disper-
sion, while State-owned enterprises (SOEs) help in its reduction. However, what is remarkable are the
low coefficients of elasticities, both in absolute and in relative terms, when compared to the Western
findings, which are always below 0.35, and often in the neighbourhood of 0.15. That is to say, most
of the fruits of the impressive technological catching-up have not been passed through wages. When
looking at growth rates, such elasticities vary across the quantiles of the wage growth distributions ac-
cording to a U-shaped relation,1 with the lowest and highest wage growth quantiles having relatively
higher pass-through degrees.
In order to exploit the time structure of the dataset while preserving the quantile regression ap-
proach, we also perform both a correlated random and a fixed effects quantile estimation. The esti-
mated dynamic panel quantile regressions do confirm the different role played by SOEs vis-à-vis pri-
vate ones, with only the former exerting an equalizing role. Overall, our results suggest the continuing
coexistence of two processes of wage determination, distinct in terms of their degrees of idiosyncratic
market responsiveness.
Finally, with respect to the wage-productivity variance relationship we find a positive monotonic
link: hence sectors characterized by a less dispersed distribution in productivities display also rela-
tively more equal wage distributions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the institutional transformations
and some ensuing effects, while Section 3 presents the data structure together with some descrip-
tive evidence on the coupled dynamics between wage and productivity. In Section 4 we perform a
shift-and-share decomposition of wage and productivity dispersions to detect the different sources
of heterogeneity. Section 5 addresses the firm-level link between wage and productivity by means
of quantile regressions, both pooled and longitudinal. Finally, Section 6 provides some theoretical
interpretations and Section 7 concludes our analysis.
2. The institutional transformations: the broad picture
Let us start by placing the dynamics of wage and productivity in the broader context of the institu-
tional and structural transformations which China underwent. During the period 1998-2007 there are
at least three remarkable institutional changes that might have influenced the relationship between
wage and productivity, namely the process of restructuring of SOEs, the adherence to the WTO, and
finally the introduction of the minimum wage. Together, as analysed in Author A, China undertook an
impressive process of catching-up, characterised by a dramatic growth in labour productivity. The lat-
ter was driven more by dynamics of creative restructuring of State-owned and State-participated firms
rather than sheer Schumpeterian patterns of creative destruction. Indeed, the drivers of catching-up
in China have been more the State-owned enterprises, and various forms of State-private ventures
than the purely private ones.
After the Southern Tour of Deng Xiaoping in 1992, the process of restructuring of SOEs started,
1In the following, the reference to a U-shaped pattern refers to the behaviour across quantiles and has to be distinguished
from the existence of any underling U functional form in the sense of Haans et al. (2016).
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with an intensification phase from 1993 to 2003. The restructuring process was meant to render SOEs
ever-more competitive in those sectors defined as strategic ones, such as telecommunication, comput-
ers, various “heavy industries”, transportation and energy. Importantly, SOEs dramatically reduced
their role as comprehensive welfare providers. As a result of this series of reforms, the occupational
share of SOEs largely shrank, shedding 28 millions of workers and reducing the number of SOEs from
120 to 32 thousand in 2004 (see Xia et al. 2014).
Dong (2005) investigates the dynamics of wage inequality and compares the drivers more linked to
observable worker individual characteristics, such as education, with those linked to firm characteris-
tics: the findings suggest that it is where you work and not who you are that more contributed to raising
wage inequality. A complementary analysis regarding the role of SOEs in the evolution of wage dis-
persion is undertaken in Appleton et al. (2014) using CHIP urban household survey data. The authors
document that since the beginning of the market transition of SOEs in 1986, although the centralised
wage setting process was gradually dismantled, SOEs tended to more equally distribute bonuses to
workers, in particular providing higher bonuses for low-wage workers, and relatively lower ones for
high-wage workers. The opposite instead occurred inside private firms, wherein a more market-prone
wage setting scheme has been adopted, rewarding more, the more proficient workers.
Another stream of literature has been looking at the relationship between wage inequality and
trade openness. In particular, Han et al. (2012) document a pattern of increasing wage inequality, using
Chinese Urban Household Survey data from 1988 to 2008, by means of a quantile regression strategy
controlling for the impacts produced by the Southern Tour (1992) and the WTO China adherence
(2001) for low, medium and high wage percentiles. Some other studies focus on the reverse causation,
from wages to productivity, and look at the effects of minimum wage regulations, as China since
2004 has strongly reinforced the sanctions for not compliant firms. Hau et al. (2016) report on the so
called cleansing effects of minimum wage. The higher labour costs might have triggered processes
of internal restructuring. Conversely, negligible impacts of minimum wage upon employment are
recorded (Mayneris et al., 2018), in line with the general evidence for advanced economies (Schmitt,
2013).
Overall the findings on wage convergence/divergence are rather controversial, with households
data showing an increasing divergence, while manufacturing data, as we shall discuss, show conver-
gence. In fact, households inequality grew notwithstanding the increase in nominal and real wages.
On the one hand, some authors point at the potential erosion of the immense unlimited supply of
labour from agricultural areas, as signalled by the “dramatic” nominal wage growth for migrant work-
ers in the urban areas from 2003 to 2009 (Fang and Yang, 2011). On the other hand, as we shall show,
labour productivity over the same period increased by almost one order of magnitude more: hence,
whether the so called Lewis turning point has been reached is still a major question mark.
In the following we enrich the current understanding of the dynamics of wage and productivity
dispersions and jointly study the dynamic of the pass-through from the latter to the former. Basically,
there are two major stylised facts which we are going to document in this work. First, elasticities are
greater than zero – hence, strictly speaking, no “unlimited supply of labour” applies, and second,
such elasticities are much smaller than one – indeed often around one-tenth – suggesting a pattern of
income distribution biased toward increasing profits.
In order to provide a long run picture of the wage-productivity elasticity let us begin with ag-
gregate manufacturing data. Figure 1, left panel, shows the wage-productivity elasticities, i.e. the
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ratio between the percentage change of real wage and the percentage change of labour productivity,
for China’s manufacturing sector since 1979 (both annual, blue line, and three years moving average,
red line). One can observe three periods of decreasing elasticities (pass-through): the first one be-
tween mid-1980s to mid-1990s characterized by the decentralization of State power and an increasing
decision-making autonomy of the SOEs; the second period between 2003-2008 (from the end of the
restructuring of SOEs to the global financial crisis) characterized by the massive entry of domestic
private-owned enterprises; the third one, from 2011 to the present, characterized by the slowing down
of real wage growth.
Figure 1: Left panel: wage-productivity elasticities in the manufacturing sector (1978-2016). Right panel: com-
parison of elasticities, World Bank/CEIC vs. ASIE manufacturing dataset (1998-2007).
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Sources: World Bank (real value added), NBSC and CEIC (employment growth). Note: the time series is not
continuous in 2004 because it is a census year.
Along this time-span we shall focus on the period covered by our micro-level dataset (see below).
Note that Figure 1, left panel, is recovered by the World Bank dataset to estimate real value added
(retrieved in US dollars, adjusted into Chinese yuan using the exchange rate from OECD, and deflated
using the Production Price Index from NBSC), by the NBSC (for the period 1978-1998) and CEIC (for
the period 1999-2015) datasets2 to construct employment growth, and by the NBSC for the entire 1978-
2016 period for average wage of staff and workers. Our micro-level dataset is restricted to firms above
a certain turn-over threshold, covering the 90% of Chinese manufacturing value added. Among the
latter, elasticities are systematically lower than in the former: cf. Figure 1, right panel. The discrepancy
is due to an under-recorded productivity growth by the World Bank dataset.
3. Data
3.1. Data description
We draw upon firm level data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprise (ASIE) collected by
the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). The dataset includes all industrial firms with sales
2CEIC is a data company providing macro and micro economic data covering over 200 economies; the ultimate source of
CEIC’s China Premium Database is NBSC.
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above 5 million RMB covering the period 1998-20073 and has already been employed in other em-
pirical investigations, among others, Author A.4 The survey covers approximately 55 to 79 million
workers, accounting for about 7.5% to 10.5% of the total Chinese employment.5 Each firm is assigned
to a sector according to the 4-digit Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) system that closely matches
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) employed by the U.S. Bureau of Census.6 Out of the com-
prehensive set of all firms, we focus on manufacturing firms only (CIC 13 - 42): Table 1 shows their
summary statistics. The total number of employees in the manufacturing sector has increased from 50
in 1998 to 68 million in 2007, after a fall by 5.7 million from 1998 to 2001. The total output has increased
from 5.93 to 35 trillion RMB in the same period and the number of firms from 148 to 310 thousand units
approximately (see Table A.2 for the number of firms by ownership type). In the analysis that follows
we apply a few cleaning procedures in order to eliminate visible recording errors, yielding what we
call “China Micro Manufacturing” (CMM).7 And we keep firms existing for at least two consecutive
years.
Table 1: Summary statistics (total) of the Chinese manufacturing firm-level dataset.
Year Number
of Firms
Value
Added Sales
Output Emp Wage Welfare Cost oflabour
1998 148 661 1.52 5.48 5.94 50.72 342.93 46.02 0.44
1999 146 075 1.68 5.96 6.37 47.36 351.00 46.18 0.45
2000 147 246 1.96 7.14 7.48 45.83 387.10 50.98 0.49
2001 155 659 2.22 7.99 8.40 44.95 416.39 54.01 0.50
2002 165 793 2.62 9.37 9.79 45.87 471.95 58.29 0.56
2003 181 001 3.40 12.38 12.72 48.71 549.46 67.81 0.65
2004 258 869 4.80 17.14 17.74 56.52 725.44 81.29 0.84
2005 250 952 5.71 21.34 21.74 59.21 885.13 101.51 1.02
2006 278 644 7.23 26.99 27.40 63.32 1090.65 123.65 1.25
2007 312 284 9.37 34.70 35.27 68.38 1415.58 139.62 1.60
Note: all values are denoted in trillion RMB (wage and welfare are in billion RMB) and employment in millions
of workers. All manufacturing firms are included. The output of year 2004 is not directly available from the
original dataset, thus, we proxy it using “sales - year beginning inventory + year end inventory”.
3.2. Variables
Labour productivity (piijt) is the ratio of value added (at 1998 constant prices) over the number of
employees, in logs. It is deflated by the 4-digit output deflator (source: Brandt et al. 2012). The choice
of labour productivity rather than TFP is motivated by the following reasons. First, the proxy for
capital is very noisy on Chinese data. Capital measures (in firm’s balance sheet) are calculated as the
value of fixed capital stock at original purchase prices (book values are the sum of nominal values for
3Available firm-level data for the following period (up to 2014) present missing elements for crucial variables. Addi-
tionally, after 2011 ASIE changed the scope of the survey, moving the threshold to 20 million RMB, therefore making the
post-2011 data not comparable with ours.
4Industry is defined to include mining, manufacturing and public utilities, according to NBSC. Five million RMB is
approximately $US 600,000.
5The number of employees by firm ownership type is presented in Table A.3.
6In 2003, the classification system was revised. Some sectors were further disaggregated, while others were merged
together. To make the industry code comparable over time, we adopted the harmonized classification proposed in Brandt
et al. (2012).
7We dropped firms with missing, zero or negative output, value-added, sales, original value of fixed assets, with em-
ployment < 8.
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different years). Second, as reported in Autor A, the within-country, within-sector micro correlations
between labour productivities (V A/L) and capital/output ratios (K/V A), for whatever proxy for
K, are robustly negative in China. In other words, labour and capital productivities are strongly
positively correlated. In fact, labour productivities and capital/labour ratios – as a proxy of degrees of
production mechanization/automation – are basically orthogonal. Overall, the evidence suggests that
very little action comes from “moving along isoquants” in response to relative prices. Rather, “best
practice” techniques involve a more efficient use of both labour and capital, and relatedly, catching-
up fundamentally involves improvements on both dimensions. It is a world of complementarities
rather than substitution, in which technology-gaps and learning efforts are both reflected by labour
productivity differences, quite independently from relative prices, while TFP proxies might well yield
a quite distorted picture of the development process. Indeed, given the ubiquitous complementarities
between labour and capital, labour productivities alone turn out to be a robust proxy for the lower
bound of “true” efficiency distributions, with the added advantage of avoiding any explicit or implicit
hypothesis on interfactor substitutability and capital measurements.
Firm’s total labour compensation is composed by wages, unemployment insurance and welfare
benefits. Wage (wijt) is the ratio of firm’s total labour compensation (at 1998 constant prices) over the
number of employees, in logs. It is deflated by the consumer price index (source: National Bureau
of Statistics of China). Unfortunately we have a unique recorded wage per firm, therefore we can
only account for the average wage. If anything, our elasticity might over-estimate the effective pass-
through as the wage measure comprises both production/non-supervisory workers and supervisory
ones (including managers). Dynamically, our wage measure might be further inflated by the potential
differential growth of the number of supervisory/managerial vs production workers. Table 2 shows
the summary statistics. Figure 2 shows the kernel density distributions of wages and labour produc-
tivities for three selected years. Already at a first glance some interesting patterns do emerge. While,
not surprisingly, the support of the productivity distribution only partly overlaps with the wage dis-
tribution, over time the support of the former clearly moves to the right, but the support of the latter
remains roughly constant. Together, a lower mode in the wage distribution hints at an increasing
wage-productivity gap for the right tail of the distribution itself. Figure 3 shows the kernel density
distributions of the growth rates of wage and labour productivity (beginning, mid-, end periods). The
two distributions roughly overlap until 2001. Interestingly, both the lower and the upper tails of the
wage growth distribution become much fatter since 2002, after the adherence to the WTO, indicating
an increasing granularity of the wage growth rate.
We identify seven categories of firms according to their ownership and governance structures.
They are State-owned enterprises (SOEs); collective-owned enterprises (COEs), Hong Kong, Macao
and Taiwan-invested enterprises (HMTs); foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), including foreign MNCs
(FMNC) and joint ventures (JV) with a foreign share above 25%; shareholding enterprises (SHEs),
that is State-private Chinese joint ventures; private-owned enterprises (POEs); and other domestic
enterprises (ODEs).8 Figure 4 shows the evolution of the means of wage and labour productivities by
six major ownership types highlighting a generalised divergence in functional income distribution.
Figure 5 and Table A.4 show the evolution of the wage-productivity elasticities by six major ownership
types. Again, the year of WTO adherence is associated with a major negative shock in the latter
8As reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix, the original 23 registration categories have been aggregated in line with
Jefferson et al. (2003).
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Table 2: Summary statistics (mean) of the dataset after cleaning.
Year Number
of Firms
Labour Pro-
ductivity
Wage (log-) Labour
Productivity (log-) Wage
Growth of
Labour
Productivity
Growth of
Wage
1998 108286 44 9 3.101 1.873 NA NA
1999 125917 48 9 3.181 1.936 0.070 0.076
2000 126054 54 10 3.314 2.038 0.061 0.076
2001 138410 59 10 3.439 2.071 0.046 −0.008
2002 149189 68 11 3.569 2.152 0.083 0.067
2003 162086 76 12 3.716 2.230 0.099 0.063
2004 211534 88 13 3.817 2.345 0.047 0.089
2005 238160 97 14 3.957 2.476 0.154 0.155
2006 265912 114 17 4.118 2.616 0.171 0.158
2007 248299 137 19 4.315 2.764 0.177 0.140
Note: labour productivity and wages are at 1998 constant price, in 1000 RMB. Growth rates are calculated as log
differences of real values over two consecutive years. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
Figure 2: Distribution of (log) wages and labour productivities (at 1998 constant price), years 1998, 2003, 2007.
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Pooling all firms in manufacturing. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
elasticities due to a dramatic decline in the rate of wage growth which in some of the ownership types
becomes even negative. SOEs are among those two reporting the highest ratio in the entire time span.
4. Convergence in wages and productivities dispersions across firms
Moving a step deeper into the analysis of the degrees of heterogeneity, let us present alternative mea-
sures of dispersion for productivity and wages within narrowly defined sectors and/or ownership
types. In the following we shall discuss interdecile ratios and shift-and-share variance decomposition
of both variables.
4.1. 90-10 ratio
The 90 − 10 wage (productivity) ratio is defined as the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 10th per-
centile of the wage (productivity) distribution, also known as the interdecile range. Figure 6 shows
the converging trend of both between-firm wage and productivity dispersions. The average wage in
the highest paying firms, i.e. those at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution, were 2.7 times those
at the bottom decile in 1998, and the ratio decreased to 1.7 in 2007. The productivity of firms at the
90th percentile of the productivity distribution were 2.7 times higher than those at the bottom decile,
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Figure 3: Distribution of growth rates of wage and of labour productivities, year 1999, 2003, 2007.
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Pooling all firms in manufacturing. Source: our elaboration on CMM. All distributions are on the same scale.
Figure 4: Wages and labour productivities levels (means) by six major ownership types.
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Figure 5: Elasticities (growth of real wage per employee over growth of labour productivity) by six major
ownership types.
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Source: Table A.4.
and 1.8 times in 2007. This sharp decline occurred for all ownership structures as shown in Figure A.2
and Table 3. Interestingly, SOEs present the highest initial ratios for wage and productivity dispersion
in 1998, but they display also the steepest fall compared to other ownership types.
Figure 6: Wage/productivity 90-10 ratio by year, all manufacturing firms.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
(log−) labour productivity
(log−) wage per employee
90−10 ratio
Note: equal weights. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
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Table 3: Wage/productivity 90-10 ratios, 90-50 ratios and 50-10 ratios by six major ownership types.
90-10 ratio 90-50 ratio 50-10 ratio
Productivity Wage Productivity Wage Productivity Wage
Ownership 1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007
State-owned 4.5 2.1 3.9 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.3 2.9 1.6 2.7 1.5
Collective-owned 2.1 1.9 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.3
HMT-invested 2.2 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.3
Foreign-invested 2.2 1.9 2.2 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.3
Shareholding 2.3 1.8 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.7 1.3
Private-owned 2.1 1.8 2.3 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.8 1.3
Figure 7: Wage (left)/productivity (right) at the top (90-50 ratio) versus bottom (50-10 ratio) of the distribution
by year, all manufacturing firms.
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Note: equal weights. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
4.2. 90-50 and 50-10 ratios
In order to understand the source of the convergence, we split the 90 − 10 ratio in two components.
The 90−50 wage (productivity) ratio is defined as the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 50th percentile
(the median) of the wage (productivity) distribution. It captures the dispersion in the upper tail of the
distribution. Symmetrically, the 50− 10 wage (productivity) ratio is the ratio of the 50th percentile to
the 10th percentile of the wage (productivity) distribution, capturing the dispersion in the bottom tail
of the distribution.
The evidence suggests that convergence is mainly driven by the push at the bottom of the wage
distribution while only a very mild convergence has happened at the top (Figure 7 [left]). Interest-
ingly there is a significant drop of the degree of divergence in the bottom part between 2003 and 2004,
probably due also to the enforcement of the minimum wage legislation in 2004. Figure 7 [right] shows
the evolution of the top and the bottom of the productivity distributions, suggesting, again, that con-
vergence has been more at the bottom, starting around 1999, when the process of SOEs restructuring
was almost completed.
Disaggregating by ownership types, Figure A.3 shows the evolution of the top and bottom of the
wage distribution. The discrete drop between 2003 and 2004 is more pronounced for all domestic
ownership types, while wage adjustments have been smoother in foreign-invested firms. Figure A.4
reports the same analysis for productivity. Interestingly, the strongest converging trend at the top of
productivity distribution concerns the domestic privately enterprises (POEs) and shareholding ones
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(SHEs). Note that convergence at the top might mean two opposite things, namely, that the top slows
down with respect to the median, or, conversely, that the median catches-up with the top. Conversely,
the strongest converging trend at the bottom concerns state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and sharehold-
ing ones (SHEs).
4.3. Decomposition of wage/productivity variance
Having detected some convergence processes in the distribution of both wages and productivity
driven by the bottom part of the distribution, let us investigate by means of a shift and share decompo-
sition the relative contribution of the within and between sectoral components. The (labour-weighted)
variance of wage (V ar wijt)/ productivity (V ar piijt) is decomposed into a within-sector component
and a between-sector one, according to Berlingieri et al. (2017):
∑
i
Lijt
Lt
(wijt − wt)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Var wijt
≡
∑
j
Ljt
Lt
∑
i∈j
Lijt
Ljt
(wijt − wjt)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
within
+
∑
j
Ljt
Lt
(wjt − wt)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
between
(1)
where Lijt is the number of employees of firm i in sector j at time t; Ljt is the total number of em-
ployees of sector j at time t; Lt is the total number of employees at time t; wt =
∑
i
∑
j
Lijt
Lt
wijt is the
grand (labour) weighted mean of wages; wjt =
∑
i∈j
Lijt
Ljt
wijt is the sectoral (labour) weighted mean of
wages. The decomposition is done by pooling all firms in manufacturing for each 2-digit sector.9
As shown in Table 4 and in Table 5, the within-sector (between-firms) component accounts for
around 80% of the wage (productivity) dispersion in each 2-digit sector, every year. The results corrob-
orate an increasing empirical literature documenting that the between firms wage/productivity varia-
tion is the major driver of the observed heterogeneity. Figure 8 shows the evolution of the shares
of the within-sectoral wage/labour productivity dispersions: while the within sectoral component of
productivity dispersion presents a clear decreasing trend, the same does not occur for the sectoral com-
ponent of wage dispersion, which oscillates between 87% and 84% in the period under study. It is an
interesting and suggestive piece of evidence. The fall of the within-sector component in productivity
dynamics hints at a generalized catching-up process cutting across all manufacturing, steadily reduc-
ing dualism, as the classics of development theory would have argued, between a modern/dynamic
part of the industry and an informal/backward one. Conversely, the persistency of the within com-
ponent in wages strongly suggests a persistent heterogeneity in labour market conditions, and in
bargaining and power relations between firms and workers.
The conjecture is supported by the evidence on the evolution of the share of within-sector wage
and labour productivity dispersions by the six major ownership types (see Figure A.5). This allows to
disentangle the different behaviour of State owned vs. private firms. So the within share of the total
wage variance of SOEs is much lower than other ownership types and decreasing from 78% in 1998
to 60% in 2007. Conversely, that of domestic private firms (POEs) increases from 80% to 95% in 2007.
A similar pattern does also characterize the within share of productivity variance, with a decreasing
within share of SOEs, from 70% to 50% in 2007 and an increasing within share of POEs, from 70% to
9Note: deviation from the labour-weighted 4-digit wage mean.
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Table 4: Share of within-sector wage variance.
CIC SECTOR 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Whole manufacturing 87.0 85.3 85.5 85.6 84.2 84.9 84.1 85.1 85.9 87.1
13 Processing of food from agricultural products 92.2 94.4 95.1 87.8 85.4 94.9 97.5 97.3 98.4 98.3
14 Foodstuff 93.2 96.2 94.6 94.3 90.3 94.8 94.8 94.3 94.5 95.8
15 Manuf. of beverages 92.9 91.7 91.9 93.7 92.3 93.2 86.3 90.0 90.3 89.9
16 Manuf. of tobacco 89.2 89.4 88.3 90.6 87.0 82.3 61.7 80.1 85.1 66.8
17 Manuf. of textile 97.6 96.4 95.5 96.6 96.0 96.5 96.3 96.7 95.1 96.3
18 Manuf. of textile wearing apparel, footwear, cand caps 98.8 99.3 99.7 99.7 99.0 99.5 99.7 99.9 99.8 99.5
19 Manuf. of leather, fur, feather and related products 99.0 98.1 98.5 98.5 99.0 99.1 99.6 99.5 99.6 98.7
20 Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, 97.3 96.9 95.9 95.3 97.5 94.7 97.3 96.1 97.4 97.0
21 Manuf. of furniture 98.8 98.2 96.8 95.2 96.5 97.8 98.7 97.9 97.0 98.2
22 Manuf. of paper and paper products 99.5 99.4 99.2 99.2 99.6 99.3 99.3 99.1 99.3 98.0
23 Printing, reproduction of recording media 98.9 99.2 98.1 97.7 98.5 99.1 99.5 99.7 98.8 99.5
24 Manuf. of articles for culture, education and sport activity 94.5 93.8 95.3 95.8 95.3 96.9 96.4 97.8 98.7 98.7
25 Processing of petroleum, coking, processing of nuclear fuel 89.1 77.9 80.8 93.5 79.3 73.0 76.3 71.0 72.0 82.3
26 Manuf. of raw chemical materials and chemical products 93.0 75.8 93.4 92.6 93.8 90.4 91.5 92.9 93.2 93.8
27 Manuf. of medicines 97.9 98.1 97.5 98.7 98.3 96.7 97.2 97.1 98.0 98.4
28 Manuf. of chemical fibers 93.0 85.2 88.2 91.3 93.6 94.6 92.7 75.7 83.3 85.2
29 Manuf. of rubber 98.3 94.1 88.1 95.6 94.4 93.9 94.2 93.0 95.5 96.1
30 Manuf. of plastics 97.4 97.2 96.1 96.0 98.4 97.2 96.9 97.1 95.9 96.5
31 Manuf. of non-metallic mineral products 96.4 95.2 94.1 94.5 94.6 95.6 95.6 92.8 93.9 94.4
32 Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 84.9 84.5 82.7 82.9 77.1 82.0 85.7 85.7 88.0 88.8
33 Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals 87.2 91.1 84.4 88.9 83.9 86.6 90.0 88.2 88.9 90.3
34 Manuf. of metal products 93.4 94.3 93.9 98.0 93.7 95.8 94.8 95.8 97.6 96.7
35 Manuf. of general purpose machinery 92.2 93.8 92.2 96.1 95.3 94.2 94.5 95.4 94.3 94.7
36 Manuf. of special purpose machinery 92.1 90.7 89.2 89.5 89.5 88.8 92.0 93.0 92.3 90.3
37 Manuf. of transport equipment 89.9 91.7 86.4 86.6 84.7 84.5 85.7 87.7 82.7 88.8
39 Manuf. of electrical machinery and equipment 95.0 90.0 97.4 96.2 95.9 95.0 93.6 95.8 95.9 96.2
40 Manuf. of communication equipment, computers and other electronic
equipment
90.7 89.3 89.2 91.7 88.4 88.7 77.9 84.2 89.5 88.5
41 Manuf. of measuring instruments and machinery for cultural activity and
office work
89.7 93.3 85.9 95.4 92.4 93.2 91.6 90.6 86.9 88.5
42 Manuf. of artwork and other manufacturing 83.4 90.4 89.9 89.7 96.2 93.3 95.3 95.5 94.0 95.1
Note: variance is labour weighted.
85%. That is, under our foregoing conjecture, SOEs converged more consistently as a whole.
5. A quantile regression analysis of the wage-productivity nexus
In order to further analyse the wage-productivity nexus, let us first consider standard pooled OLS
estimates. Recall from Figure 2 that looking at levels, both wage and productivity distributions dis-
play skewness and fat tails. At the same time growth rates are tent-shaped. All this evidence on
deep heterogeneity and lack of Gaussian features militates in favour of the use of quantile regres-
sion analysis, robust as it is to outliers and heavy tailed distributions (Koenker and Hallock, 2001).
With respect to our own dataset, Figure 9 presents the scatter plot of the wage-productivity nexus,
both in level (top panel) and in growth rates (bottom panel), for three representative 4-digit sectors.
The dashed lines present the least-square estimates, while the grey lines present the quantiles in the
range of 0.05 − 0.95. If the least-squares estimate had correctly captured the relationship, all the grey
lines and the dashed line would have been parallel. On the contrary already at a first glance does
emerge an increasing dispersion for higher and lower quantiles vis-à-vis the median one. The poor
performance of the OLS estimates to capture the underlying relationships prompts quantile regression
estimates (Koenker, 2005). In the following, we shall present pooled and dynamic quantile estimates
in levels and growth rates. Finally, we shall look at the relationship between means and variances in
productivity and wages.
5.1. Quantile regression
The quantile regression model (Koenker and Bassett Jr, 1978) reads as:
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Table 5: Share of within-sector labour productivity variance.
CIC SECTOR 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Whole manufacturing 82.7 83.5 83.5 82.4 81.1 78.7 78.0 78.7 78.0 77.7
13 Processing of food from agricultural products 89.6 93.9 95.1 93.3 91.9 92.8 92.4 92.0 92.1 90.3
14 Foodstuff 83.9 89.4 86.6 86.8 86.8 89.0 92.2 90.4 89.5 90.0
15 Manuf. of beverages 92.6 94.4 93.9 93.4 92.2 90.8 91.8 95.0 95.6 95.3
16 Manuf. of tobacco 85.3 84.1 84.5 86.5 88.6 73.6 50.3 61.6 52.6 51.7
17 Manuf. of textile 94.0 94.5 94.5 93.1 92.6 94.4 96.5 95.9 96.1 96.8
18 Manuf. of textile wearing apparel, footwear, cand caps 99.2 98.2 97.2 98.7 99.3 98.6 99.3 99.3 98.9 99.5
19 Manuf. of leather, fur, feather and related products 96.1 96.0 93.2 91.9 91.5 86.1 88.0 85.1 86.4 83.7
20 Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo, 98.5 96.6 97.4 97.4 95.8 90.8 94.0 93.4 94.6 93.6
21 Manuf. of furniture 97.0 97.7 97.8 97.2 97.1 98.9 96.6 97.4 98.2 98.7
22 Manuf. of paper and paper products 99.3 99.7 99.3 99.8 99.3 99.3 98.8 97.7 97.6 96.8
23 Printing, reproduction of recording media 94.1 96.2 94.6 91.5 94.0 93.2 95.6 96.2 96.0 95.7
24 Manuf. of articles for culture, education and sport activity 92.4 90.7 89.5 86.5 91.3 90.1 92.7 93.5 93.1 93.4
25 Processing of petroleum, coking, processing of nuclear fuel 72.0 68.8 81.9 71.7 69.3 69.2 67.4 76.4 75.6 82.5
26 Manuf. of raw chemical materials and chemical products 90.6 81.6 89.9 89.4 90.2 86.5 85.8 90.2 91.2 91.4
27 Manuf. of medicines 97.1 97.3 97.0 96.6 97.1 95.5 97.0 96.2 96.9 96.6
28 Manuf. of chemical fibers 91.8 88.4 85.4 92.1 96.1 95.4 98.9 87.3 82.7 81.4
29 Manuf. of rubber 79.3 83.9 80.9 82.2 82.9 79.5 79.9 76.6 77.8 76.6
30 Manuf. of plastics 97.4 95.2 95.2 95.0 93.4 94.3 92.0 92.2 92.0 90.6
31 Manuf. of non-metallic mineral products 93.2 92.7 90.6 88.7 86.7 87.2 87.0 86.1 88.0 87.4
32 Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals 94.8 94.0 93.1 91.9 89.2 89.9 91.5 90.1 90.8 94.8
33 Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals 96.5 94.1 96.6 92.8 92.2 92.5 92.7 90.0 89.6 90.0
34 Manuf. of metal products 93.0 94.3 94.3 94.1 94.5 94.0 89.9 92.6 93.0 93.4
35 Manuf. of general purpose machinery 93.8 96.5 95.1 95.5 95.7 93.4 94.5 93.7 92.2 93.0
36 Manuf. of special purpose machinery 85.2 86.6 80.1 85.6 87.5 86.6 90.7 94.5 93.7 92.5
37 Manuf. of transport equipment 89.0 89.9 92.7 87.4 79.7 75.7 83.6 81.1 79.0 80.1
39 Manuf. of electrical machinery and equipment 85.0 85.4 90.5 86.7 89.0 88.0 86.7 87.8 86.5 84.9
40 Manuf. of communication equipment, computers and other electronic
equipment
84.8 87.3 84.9 86.0 84.4 86.4 86.9 88.7 88.4 89.8
41 Manuf. of measuring instruments and machinery for cultural activity and
office work
88.4 86.4 88.6 89.5 91.4 87.0 84.7 83.5 78.6 76.9
42 Manuf. of artwork and other manufacturing 83.1 94.1 94.9 94.1 95.8 96.7 96.3 95.9 96.2 97.2
Note: variance is labour weighted.
Figure 8: Share of within-sector wage/labour productivity dispersion.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
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Note: pooling all firms in manufacturing sector, deviation from the 4-digit sectoral labour-weighted mean.
Source: our elaboration on CMM.
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Figure 9: Scatterplot and quantile regression fit.
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
−6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(log) labour productivity
(lo
g) 
wa
ge
 p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
CIC 1310
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
−6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(log) labour productivity
(lo
g) 
wa
ge
 p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
CIC 1711
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
−6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(log) labour productivity
(lo
g) 
wa
ge
 p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
CIC 2511
The plots in the first row show a scatter plot on wage level vs. productivity level of three representative 4-digit
sectors (manufacturing of textile clothing, plastic, communication transmitting equipment). The plots in the
second row show a scatter plot on wage growth vs. productivity growth. Superimposed on the plots are the
0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95 quantile regression lines in grey, the median fit in solid black, and the least-squares
estimate of the conditional mean function as the dashed line (Koenker, 2005). Source: our elaboration on CMM.
yit = x
′
itβτ + uτit with Qτ (yit|xit) = x′itβτ (2)
where yit is the dependent variable, x is a set of regressors, β is the vector of parameters to be esti-
mated, and u is a vector of residuals. Qτ (yit|xit) stands for the τ th conditional quantile of yit given xit.
The τ th conditional quantile solves the minimization problem:
βτ ≡ argmin
b
E[ρτ (yit − x′itb)] (3)
where ρ(u) = 1(u > 0) · τ |u| + 1(u ≤ 0) · (1 − τ)|u| is called the “check function”. If τ = 0.5,
this turns out in terms of least absolute deviations. In this case, Qτ (yit|xit) is the conditional median
since it minimizes absolute deviations. Otherwise, the check function weights positive and negative
terms asymmetrically. The quantile regression estimator, βˆτ is the sample analogy of Equation 3. This
minimization procedure involves the solution of a linear programming problem. As one increases τ
from 0 to 1, one traces the entire conditional distribution of yit on xit.
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5.2. Wage - productivity levels
In the first model we mean to detect the relationship between the level of productivity and the level
of wages.10 The model, estimated at the highest levels of sectoral disaggregation (four-digit) at the
0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, 0.95 quantiles of the conditional wage level distribution, reads as:
wit = α+ βτpiit + yt + τit (4)
where wit, the dependent variable, is the (log) real wage per employee for firm i at time t, piit
the (log) labour productivity level. We also control for common macroeconomic shocks by including
year dummies yt. The violin plot in Figure 10 presents the median, the interquartile ranges, and
the kernel density distribution of the coefficient estimates for each quantile of the conditional wage
distribution. The estimated coefficients present a monotonic increasing pattern, meaning that the
wage-productivity nexus increases along the conditional wage distribution.11 Violin plots have been
usually employed to present OLS estimates across narrowly defined sectors (Dosi et al., 2015). To the
best of our knowledge this is one the few attempts using violin plots to synthetically present both the
kernel density distribution at four-digit sector and the distribution across quantiles of the dependent
variable.
At the lower quantiles of the conditional wage distribution the coefficients on labour productivity
are the lowest and conversely they are remarkably higher at the upper tail of the conditional wage
distribution, wherein 10% increase in labour productivity tends to raise the 90th and 95th quantiles of
wage distribution by 2.64% and 2.76% respectively.12 We have performed the nonparametric Kruskal-
Wallis test (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952) to detect the median differences across the distributions at the
seven quantiles of the conditional wage distribution in Figure 10. Upon rejection of the null hypothesis
of this test, we conducted post hoc multiple pairwise comparisons for stochastic dominance or median
difference using Dunn’s test (Dinno, 2015) with a Bonferroni adjustment. The medians at the 90th and
95th are significantly higher than the medians at the 5th, 10th, 25th and 50th quantiles.
Based on the coefficient estimates from the quantile regression at the 4-digit sectoral level, one
may predict the conditional quantile functions of wage that are at 10th and 90th percentiles of the
sample productivity distribution. Figure 11 presents the estimated conditional wage distribution for
the 4-digit sectors characterised by the highest number of observations. Indeed one does not find any
strong regularity of wage dispersion at the 10th and 90th percentiles of productivity distribution, with
some sectors displaying higher dispersion at the 90th rather than at the 10th percentile and others
which do not. In this respect, the link between productivity levels and wage dispersion is not very
robust to disaggregation by sector.
We further extended the analysis performing six separate estimations for each major ownership
type. The result of the quantile regression estimates is shown in Figure 12, while the median values
of the distribution of coefficients are reported in Table 6. State-owned enterprises present the highest
association between productivity and wage level with a monotonic decreasing relationship along the
10Productivity is a very persistent, strongly autocorrelated variable. Therefore we deem appropriate to perform contem-
poraneous estimates of the model in levels. Later on, in order to capture the time dimension we estimate the model in terms
of rates of growth.
11The observed monotonic increasing pattern is robust to higher levels of aggregation with estimates of Equation (4)
pooling all manufacturing firms and including 2-digit sectoral dummies. Results are available upon request.
12The reported coefficients are statistically different from zero for the majority of the sectors in this and subsequent model
estimates.
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Figure 10: Distributions of quantile regression coefficients across 424 four-digit sectors.
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Note: quantile regression estimation of equation (4) for each 4-digit sector, the coefficient of log- labour pro-
ductivity reported for the 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95 quantiles. Each violin reports a box plot and
a kernel density to each side of the box plot. The median of Pseudo R2 is 0.1426 for quantile regression. The
dashed line is the median of the distribution of OLS estimates.
Table 6: Median of the distributions in Figure 12.
Quantiles
Ownership 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 OLS β1,0.95 − β1,0.05 PseudoR2 (Median)
State-owned 0.348 0.319 0.293 0.292 0.262 0.227 0.211 0.277 -0.137 0.1781
Collective-owned 0.173 0.134 0.116 0.119 0.154 0.203 0.229 0.162 0.056 0.1235
HMT-invested 0.137 0.138 0.161 0.194 0.221 0.251 0.267 0.201 0.130 0.1466
Foreign-invested 0.156 0.163 0.203 0.254 0.293 0.286 0.284 0.246 0.128 0.1414
Shareholding 0.162 0.144 0.147 0.169 0.212 0.249 0.262 0.198 0.100 0.1423
Private-owned 0.088 0.077 0.075 0.097 0.143 0.213 0.250 0.132 0.162 0.1316
Source: our elaboration on CMM.
conditional quantile of the wage distribution, a pattern remarkably different from the other ownership
types. In fact, the quantile regression coefficients are highest at the lower tail of the wage distribution
and lowest at the upper tail. In that, SOEs seem to be comparatively more egalitarian in the sense that
wages are more anchored to productivity at the lowest wage quantiles and less at the highest ones.
We performed again the Kruskal-Wallis test on the median differences across the seven distributions
for each ownership type in Figure 12. For SOEs, the null hypothesis is always rejected. The degrees
of the association are statistically different across different quantiles on the conditional wage distribu-
tions. The opposite applies to foreign-, HMT-invested, shareholding and private-owned firms. Based
on the Kruskal-Wallis and Dunn tests, the median are not statistically different at the 5th, 10th and
25th percentiles of the conditional wage distribution. Finally, the quantile regression coefficients for
collective-owned enterprises display a slightly U-shaped pattern across quantiles. The link between
productivity and wage is relatively higher at both the lower and the upper tails of the wage distribu-
tion, albeit there appears a much higher association at the latter tail.13
13Results are robust when estimating equation (4) for each ownership type, pooling all manufacturing firms in each own-
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Figure 11: Predicted wage distribution based on the estimated conditional quantile function at the 10th and
90th percentile of labour productivity distribution.
Four examples, manufacturing of gas compression machinery (CIC 3542, first row), communications transmit-
ting equipment (CIC 4011, second row), aircrafts (CIC 1411, third row) and electrical appliances (CIC 3951, forth
row) year 1998, 2003 and 2007. Note: log-log scale.
In order to account for the effects of other potential determinants we estimate the following model,
accounting for the role of size, age, export status and geographical location:
wit = α+ βτ1piit + βτ2sizeit + βτ3ageit + βτ4exportit + ownershipit + geoi + yt + τit (5)
ership type, including 2-digit sectoral dummies.
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Figure 12: Distributions of quantile regression coefficients across four-digit sectors for each ownership type.
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Quantile regression estimation of equation (4). The coefficient on log- labour productivity reported for the 0.05,
0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95 quantiles. Note: keeping sectors with observations > 160. The dashed line is
the median of the distribution of OLS estimates.
wherewit, the dependent variable, is the (log) real wage per employee for firm i at time t, pi the (log)
labour productivity level. We control for firm’s contemporaneous size (i.e., proxied by log- number of
employees), age, exporting status (i.e., a time varying dummy taking value one if the firm has positive
exports), ownership types and regional locations We also control for common macroeconomic shocks
by including year dummies yt.
Figure 13 shows the distribution of coefficients at each quantile of the conditional wage distribu-
tion. After performing the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (i.e., testing the equality between the median
of the distribution of estimated coefficients and zero), the Kruskal-Wallis and Dunn tests (the me-
dian differences from multiple distributions, and the post hoc pairwise comparisons) we find that the
positive (median of the distribution significantly different from zero) and monotonic increasing wage-
productivity nexus is robust even controlling for firm’s size, age, exporting status, ownership types
and geographic location. Conversely, the associations between size and wage captured by the median
of the coefficient distribution of size are very different at different quantiles of the wage distribution:
while it is not significantly different from zero at the 5th quantile of wage distribution, it is positive
and significantly different from zero at the 10th, 25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles of the wage distribu-
tion, and negative and significant in the upper tail of the wage distribution (90th and 95th quantiles).
The effect of size is declining along the quantile of the wage distribution, signalling that the nexus is
lower for high-wage firms rather than for low-wage ones. The association between age and wage is
weakly positive and significant, slightly indicating that older firms tend to distribute higher wages,
but independently from the conditional wage quantile. Moreover, there is a positive and significant
association between exporting status and wage, but interestingly it is more pronounced at the lower
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Figure 13: Level model with controls, coefficients of productivity, size, age and export dummy.
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Distribution of quantile regression coefficients across 424 four-digit sectors. Note: quantile regression estimation
of equation (5) for each 4-digit sector, the coefficient on log- labour productivity, log- number of employees, age
and export dummy reported for the 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95 quantiles. The dashed line is the
median of the distribution of OLS estimates. The median of Pseudo R2 is 0.2067 for quantile regression.
tail of the wage distribution, and declining along quantiles.14
In terms of geographical location, all 31 provinces, autonomous regions and cities can be grouped
into four regions, namely, the East region (10 provinces, including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Hainan), the Middle region (6 provinces includ-
ing Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan), the West region (12 provinces, including Inner
Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shan’xi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia,
Xinjiang) and the Northeast region (3 provinces, including Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang). In the re-
gression below, we take the East region as the baseline group. Figure 14 shows the distributions of the
coefficients of regional dummies. Table 7 shows the median of the distribution along the seven quan-
tiles of the conditional wage distribution. The rank of the wage-productivity nexus from the lowest to
the highest reads as Middle, North-east, West and East meaning that those firms located in the Mid-
dle, North-east and West regions transfer lower productivity gains to wages than those firms located
in the East coast region. Moreover, the negative association is more pronounced at the lower-tail of the
14We also estimate model 5 for each ownership type (excluding ownership dummies). Results are confirmed and available
upon request.
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wage distribution in Middle and North-east region. Indeed, the lower indexation rate corresponds to
regions with a lower industrial concentration. In fact, as shown in Figure A.1 the spatial distribution
of firms is rather uneven across the Chinese provinces. The increasing concentration in the coastal
areas is associated with the heavy flows of migrant workers.
Figure 14: Coefficient of regional dummy West (left), Middle (middle), and North-east (right)
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Table 7: Median of the distributions in Figure 14.
Quantiles
Region 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 OLS
Middle -0.375 -0.360 -0.346 -0.329 -0.302 -0.274 -0.242 -0.325
West -0.228 -0.208 -0.190 -0.189 -0.192 -0.182 -0.176 -0.197
North-east -0.297 -0.289 -0.271 -0.235 -0.196 -0.165 -0.159 -0.224
Baseline group: East region. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
5.3. Wage growth - productivity growth
In order to account for the dynamic structure of the nexus we estimate the relationship between wage
growth and productivity growth. The values of the coefficients provide an estimate of the degree of
pass-through of the latter to the former. Our model specification reads:
∆wit = α+ βτ∆piit + yt + τit (6)
where ∆wit is the growth rate of wage per employee for firm i at time t (log difference of the wage
at two consecutive years) and ∆pi represents the growth rate of labour productivity. We also control
for common macroeconomic shocks and include year dummies yt.15
We estimate model (6) for each four-digit sector at the 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95 quan-
tiles of the conditional wage growth rate distribution. Results are shown in Figure 15. First notice that
elasticities are all remarkably low (less than 0.21). Moreover, unlike the estimates in levels, the pattern
of the pass-through is U-shaped across quantiles. In the median interquartile range [0.25 − 0.75] of
the conditional wage growth distribution, the coefficient on labour productivity growth is the lowest,
15For pooled manufacturing firms, we include 2-digit industry dummies.
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0.102, that is only one tenth of labour productivity growth is passed through. Conversely, the coeffi-
cients are significantly higher in both the lower and upper tails of the wage growth distribution.16 The
significance of the U-shaped pattern is confirmed by the Kruskal-Wallis and Dunn tests. Interestingly,
the U-shaped patterns are independent from the type of ownership structure: Figure 16 shows the
estimates of Equation (6) for each ownership type. Table 8 shows the median value of the coefficient
distributions per each quantile. The significance of the U-shaped pattern at the ownership level is
confirmed by the foregoing tests.
Finally, we studied at 4-digit sectoral level the predicted wage growth rates distribution at the 10th
and 90th percentiles of the distribution of productivity growth rates. Figure 17 reports the results for
two sectors, which are well representative of most of them. The Figure presents a significant overlap of
the wage growth distribution: independently from being a high-growth or a low-growth productivity
firm, the predicted process of wage growth is the same. The latter observation clearly militates in
favour of the process of convergence presented in Section 4.
Figure 15: Distribution of quantile regression coefficients over 424 four-digit sectors.
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Quantile regression estimation of equation (6) for each 4-digit sector: the coefficient on growth of labour pro-
ductivity reported for the 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95 quantiles. Median of Pseudo R2 is 0.0348. The
dashed line is the median of the distribution of OLS estimates.
Table 8: Median of the distributions in Figure 16.
Quantiles
Ownership 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 OLS Pseudo R2 (Median)
State-owned 0.191 0.155 0.118 0.106 0.127 0.164 0.198 0.153 0.0580
Collective-owned 0.221 0.183 0.136 0.117 0.149 0.199 0.228 0.187 0.0535
HMT-invested 0.153 0.135 0.103 0.092 0.116 0.163 0.186 0.139 0.0502
Foreign-invested 0.134 0.117 0.086 0.079 0.104 0.146 0.169 0.125 0.0492
Shareholding 0.151 0.131 0.101 0.099 0.131 0.169 0.195 0.146 0.0496
Private-owned 0.153 0.137 0.106 0.108 0.140 0.178 0.210 0.150 0.0448
Source: our elaboration on CMM.
We also estimate the growth model with controls and we perform, as usual, the Kruskal-Wallis
16We observe very similar results even when pooling all manufacturing firms, including 2-digit sectoral dummies.
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Figure 16: Quantile regression coefficients for each ownership type.
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Quantile regression estimation of equation (6) pooling all manufacturing firms, including 2-digit sectoral dum-
mies. The dashed line is the median of the distribution of OLS estimates.
Figure 17: Predicted wage growth rate distribution based on the estimated conditional quantile function at the
10th and 90th percentiles of labour productivity growth rate distribution.
Two examples, manufacturing of gas compression machinery (CIC 3542, first row), communications transmit-
ting equipment (CIC 4011, second rows), year 1998, 2003 and 2007. Note: y-axis in log scale.
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Figure 18: Growth model with controls, coefficients of productivity growth, size, age and export dummy.
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Distribution of quantile regression coefficients across 424 four-digit sectors. Note: quantile regression estimation
of equation (7) for each 4-digit sector, the coefficient on log- labour productivity, log- number of employees, age
and export dummy reported for the 0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95 quantiles. The dashed line is the
median of the distribution of OLS estimates. The median of Pseudo R2 is 0.0519 for quantile regression.
and Dunn tests.
∆wit = α+ βτ1∆piit + βτ2sizeit + βτ3ageit + βτ4exportit + ownershipit + geoi + yt + τit (7)
Figure 18 shows the coefficient estimates for productivity growth, size, age, and exporting status.
Consistent with Figure 15, the U-shaped pattern is robust. Size displays a negative association with
wage growth at the upper tail, while age has a mild decreasing monotonic pattern along the quantiles
of wage growth. A similar monotonically decreasing but more pronounced pattern emerges with
respect to exporting status. These aggregate findings are confirmed when decomposed by ownership
structure (results available upon request).
5.4. Dynamic quantile regression: correlated random and fixed effects estimations
In the following we shall discuss and replicate our analysis employing the panel dimension of the
data to control for unobserved heterogeneity, therefore linking quantile regression and dynamic panel
techniques. In particular, we shall present the results of both the correlated random and fixed effect
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models. Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) propose to link the quantile regression estimation with corre-
lated random effects using Chamberlain (1982) and Chamberlain (1984) approach (only for balanced
panel).17 According to the correlated random effect model, yit is generated by:
yit = x
′
itβ + ci + uit (8)
where the time invariant idiosyncratic component ci behaves according to:
ci = φ(xi) + vi, E(vi|xi) = 0 (9)
For any τ ∈ [0, 1], the conditional quantile function of yit is:
Qτ (yit|xi) = x′itβ +Qτ (vi + uit|xit) + φ(xi) (10)
assuming that vi is orthogonal to xi and allowing for the heteroschedasticity of xi, that isQτ (uit|xi, vi) =
Qτ (uit|xit) we have the final specification for the quantile regression with a correlated random effect
estimation:
Qτ (yit|xit) = x′itβτ + φ(xi) (11)
where
x′itβτ = x
′
itβ +Qτ (vi + uit|xit) (12)
with φ(xi), in the case of balanced panel, being:
φ(xi) = ψ
t
τ + x
′
i1λ
1
τ + ...+ x
′
iTλ
T
τ (13)
or alternatively for an unbalanced panel we have φ(xi) = ψtτ +x′iλτ (Mundlak, 1978). In the following,
we estimate a wage level - productivity level quantile regression with a correlated random effect,
according to such an approach, as our panel is not balanced.
Figure 19 shows the results for the correlated random effect model (CREM) which accounts for the
dynamic evolution of idiosyncratic productivity over time, according to the specification of Equation
10. That is, the estimates of the wage-productivity nexus consider the micro dynamics of productivi-
ties. According to this procedure, the coefficients do not show any significant difference among quan-
tiles at the aggregate level. Conditioning on the productivity gains the pass-through is completely
flat. However, when disaggregating by ownership structure, the quantile regression with correlated
random effects confirms the same pattern obtained in the pooled analysis for SOEs, as shown in Fig-
ure B.6 and Table 9, with a declining pass-through across wage quantiles, but differently from the
pooled estimates, an almost constant pass-through for the rest of ownership types.
An alternative specification to treat unobserved heterogeneity is the fixed effects estimator, accord-
ing to Koenker (2004)’s method. The method, which proposes a penalizing estimator, imposes that the
effect of the unobserved time-invariant characteristics of the firm has to be the same at each quantile
17The pooled quantile regression employed the panel structure of the data only for computing standard errors. Since each
firm appears at least once in the data, the clustered sampling bootstrap is used. Being present dependence within firm’s
indicators over years, the standard asymptotic-variance formula (Koenker and Bassett Jr, 1978) and the standard bootstrap
approach, both based upon independent observations, should not be applied. Hence, instead, a given bootstrap sample is
created by repeatedly drawing (with replacement) a firm from the sample of M firms and including all its measures (over
years), where the draws continue until the desired bootstrap sample size is reached.
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Figure 19: Model in level - CREM.
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Distribution of quantile regression coefficients across 424 four-digit sectors. Note: quantile regression estimation
of equation (4) for each 4-digit sector, the coefficient on log- labour productivity reported for the 0.05, 0.10, 0.25,
0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95 quantiles. The dashed line is the median of the distribution of OLS estimates. The
median of Pseudo R2 is 0.1454 for quantile regression.
Table 9: Model in level - CREM.
Quantiles
Ownership 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 Pseudo R2 (Median)
State-owned 0.261 0.232 0.192 0.165 0.144 0.123 0.119 0.1867
Collective-owned 0.243 0.181 0.146 0.134 0.152 0.186 0.204 0.1262
HMT-invested 0.156 0.134 0.126 0.130 0.141 0.157 0.170 0.1526
Foreign-invested 0.143 0.128 0.126 0.125 0.134 0.120 0.118 0.1538
Shareholding 0.164 0.148 0.142 0.140 0.147 0.163 0.171 0.1461
Private-owned 0.132 0.117 0.112 0.117 0.141 0.173 0.205 0.1343
Median of the distributions in Figure B.6. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
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Figure 20: Model in level - FE.
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Distribution of quantile regression coefficients across 424 four-digit sectors. Note: quantile regression estimation
of equation (4) for each 4-digit sector, the coefficient on log- labour productivity reported for the 0.05, 0.10, 0.25,
0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95 quantiles. The dashed line is the median of the distribution of OLS estimates. The
median of Pseudo R2 is 0.1471 for quantile regression.
τ , according to the specification:
Qτ (yit|xit) = αi + x′itβτ (14)
In this case the fixed effect is a “locational shift”, not affected by the quantile. Figure 20 shows the
distribution of coefficient estimates using the fixed-effects method. The FE quantile regression estima-
tion does confirm the same pattern emerging from the pooled analysis at the aggregate level: wage
dispersion increases with productivity, with an estimated magnitude of the coefficient rather similar
to the pooled quantile regression. Again, similarly to the pooled analysis, when accounting for the
ownership structure, SOEs show a declining pass-through along the distribution, while the opposite
occurs for the rest, as shown in Figure B.6. The different results provided by the CREM and the FE
highlight that the pass-through of productivity gains turns out to be flat when accounting for the dy-
namics of firm-level productivities (CREM), washing out the apparent increasing pattern revealed by
the FE estimators. In this respect, given the impressive process of productivity catching-up, the CREM
reveals to be more appropriate to explicitly capture the degree of pass-through.
Finally, as a robustness test, we check the growth specification with both CREM and FE. As shown
in Figure 21 in both cases the dynamic quantile specifications closely follow the model in first-differences
(growth model), as expected.
5.5. Variance of wage and variance of productivity
In order to further study the relationship between wage and productivity dispersion, let us estimate
the association between the variance of log-wage and of log-labour productivity across firms in the
same 4-digit sector according to the following model:
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Table 10: Model in level - FE.
Quantiles
Ownership 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 Pseudo R2 (Median)
State-owned 0.347 0.323 0.296 0.283 0.260 0.227 0.211 0.1858
Collective-owned 0.183 0.144 0.121 0.126 0.155 0.206 0.229 0.1327
HMT-invested 0.144 0.138 0.158 0.186 0.219 0.249 0.262 0.1550
Foreign-invested 0.157 0.163 0.202 0.243 0.281 0.283 0.277 0.1554
Shareholding 0.166 0.144 0.147 0.170 0.214 0.249 0.259 0.1488
Private-owned 0.091 0.078 0.076 0.097 0.144 0.213 0.250 0.1362
Median of the distributions in Figure B.6. Source: our elaboration on CMM.
Figure 21: Model in growth - CREM (left), FE (right).
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Distributions of quantile regression coefficients across 424 four-digit sectors. Note: quantile regression estima-
tion of equation (6) for each 4-digit sector, the coefficient on growth of labour productivity reported for the 0.05,
0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95 quantiles. The dashed line is the median of the distribution of OLS estimates.
The median of Pseudo R2 is 0.0361 (CREM) and 0.0371 (FE) for quantile regression.
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Figure 22: Quantile regression coefficients.
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Quantile regression estimation of equation (15) pooling all 4-digit sectors, including 2-digit sectoral dummies.
The solid line is the OLS estimate. Bootstrapped standard errors with 90% confidence band. PseudoR2 is 0.1969
for quantile regression at the 0.50 quantile.
VARwjt = α+ βτ VARpijt + yt + τjt (15)
where VARwjt is the variance of wage per employee (across firms) for sector j (at 4-digit level) at time
t, and VARpijt is that of labour productivity level. The model allows to capture the extent to which
wage dispersion at the sectoral level is affected by between-firms productivity dispersion. Similar
OLS models have been estimated in Berlingieri et al. (2017) for a cross-country analysis. However, the
quantile approach allows the study of the link between wage and productivity dispersion along the
conditional distribution of between-firms wage dispersions. Figure 22 shows the quantile compared
with the OLS estimates (horizontal solid line). The OLS coefficient is around 0.15. The monotonically
increasing quantile pattern indicates that the higher the sectoral level wage dispersion, the higher is
the contribution of sectoral productivity dispersion on it. Figure B.8 shows the quantile regression and
the OLS estimates (horizontal solid line) for each ownership type. The foregoing pattern is confirmed
independently from the ownership structure. Note that if the generating process of wages were identi-
cal across all wage quantiles one would not observe any correlation between variances of productivity
and variances in wages.
5.6. Variance of wages and mean of productivities
Yet another set of analysis aims at detecting whether the average productivity performance of the sec-
tor might affect between-firms wage dispersion, and the extent to which this might vary from less to
more dispersed wage sectors. In so doing, we indirectly detect whether the wage formation mech-
anism is affected by some industry productivity performance. Therefore, we estimate the following
model:
29
Figure 23: Quantile regression coefficients.
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Quantile regression estimation of equation (16) pooling all 4-digit sectors, including 2-digit sectoral dummies.
The solid line is the OLS estimate. Bootstrapped standard errors with 90% confidence band. PseudoR2 is 0.1629
for quantile regression at the 0.50 quantile.
VARwjt = α+ βτ MEANpijt + yt + τjt (16)
where VARwjt, the dependent variable, is the variance of wage per employee (across firms) for sector
j (at 4-digit level) at time t. MEANpijt represents the sectoral mean of labour productivity level.
Figure 23 shows the quantile regression estimates (dashed curve) and the OLS estimate (horizontal
solid line), where the OLS coefficient is around 0.075, while Figure B.9 presents the same estimation
for each ownership type. At the aggregate level the quantile regression analysis is redundant as the
quantile coefficients and the OLS ones are largely overlapping. However when decomposing for the
ownership structure, SOEs present a negative relationship, decreasing along quantiles, meaning that
the average productivity performance of the industry exerts an equalizing effect on wage dispersion
between firms, the higher the degree of wage dispersion in the given sector. The opposite occurs
for the rest of the ownership types, presenting either a positive and increasing relationship along the
distribution, as in the case of foreign firms (HMTs and foreign-invested enterprises), or an almost null
and flat one, as in the case of domestic firms. It has to be noted that the difference with the OLS
estimates loses significance for the highest quantiles in all three cases (SOEs, HMTs, foreign-invested
enterprises).
6. Theoretical interpretation
Overall, the results presented above militate in favour of the presence of two co-existing regimes of
wage formation. A first one characterizing State Owned enterprises hints at the fact that firm-level
wages (wiSO ) are (partly) indexed on the average productivity level of the industry (p¯iSO) rather than
on the firm level one: Equation 17 captures the idea, illustrated in Figure 24.A. This implies that the
pass-through is declining along the inverse of the rank of productivity distributions (cf. Equation 18
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and Figure 24.B): the lower the productivity level, the higher the pass-through (γ), and the other way
round.
Conversely, the wage-setting process occurring in all the rest of the firms seems rather different:
it entails that wages (wiPO ) are (quite partially) indexed on firm level-productivity (piiPO ). Therefore
wages increase in some proportion to firm-level productivity increases (cf. Equation 19 and see Figure
24.C) resulting into a constant pass-through along the entire productivity range of the firms (Equation
20 and Figure 24.D), independently from firms absolute ranking in terms of productivity.
wiSO = f(p¯iSO)⇒ ∆wiSO = g(∆p¯iSO) (17)
∆wiSO
∆piiSO
= h
−
(inverse prod. rank) (18)
wiPO = f(piiPO)⇒ ∆wiPO = g(∆piiPO) (19)
∆wiPO
∆piiPO
= h
⊥
(inverse prod. rank) (20)
All that, in turns, entails an underlying equalizing effect on the wage/productivity nexus. In a
way, it seems that SOEs bear still some “fossil traits” of the older Central Planning period, and also
the strongest resemblance to the regime of wage determination characterizing the “Golden Age” of
Western post-WWII capitalist growth. Conversely, the other governance forms appear to be much
more market-driven. In terms of the underlining institutions governing the labour markets, our re-
sults show clearly the absence of a collective negotiation process and the presence of firm-based distri-
butional mechanisms in the private sector. There is indeed a unique trade union, All-China Federation
of Trade Unions (ACFTU), which however acts largely as a corporate “human-resource department”
(Kuruvilla, 2018). On top of that, the role of migrant workers has been acknowledged as crucial, en-
tailing an almost unlimited supply of labour (Ngai and Huilin, 2010). Unfortunately our dataset does
not allow to look at worker flows, but the evidence reported in Figure A.1 confirms the increasing
concentration of manufacturing firms in coastal areas, where workers from the interior migrate.
The coexistence of two regimes of wage setting is also related to the processes of internal corporate
restructuring and of exposition to international global value chains. Concerning the former, Autor
A have highlighted the “creative restructuring” of state-owned enterprises with those belonging to
strategic, highly-innovative sectors remaining under the hat of the State, maintaining more egalitarian
and market-resilient forms of value distribution to workers. Concerning the latter, private firms have
been those more inserted into global value chains, therefore less keen to pass their gains on work-
ers. The Foxconn case is almost an archetype (Chan and Pun, 2010), among the biggest worldwide
employers and leading Chinese exporter. Its hiring strategy has been mainly taking advantage of
the massive migration from agricultural areas of young workers (born after 1980s). The firm is part
of an international division of production and a value chain which sees its customers (Apple, Dell,
Microsoft) squeezing its margins. Correspondingly in order to secure contracts, Foxconn minimizes
costs, and transfers the pressure of low profit margins to front-line workers. Workers are paid at an
average wage quite close to the province minimum, massively relying upon overtime hours.
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Figure 24: Top panel (State-Owned enterprises): A. The wage-productivity nexus (left); B. The ensuing pass-
through (right).
Bottom panel (Private-Owned enterprises): C. The wage-productivity nexus (left); D. The ensuing pass-through
(right)
32
7. Conclusions
Using a detailed firm-level dataset which includes all industrial firms above some minimum thresh-
old over the period 1998-2007, distinguishing also the ownership types of the firms (e.g., State-owned,
foreign MNCs, private-owned, etc.), we investigate the inter-sectoral and inter-institutional hetero-
geneity in both wage and productivity distributions and the coupled dynamics of the two variables,
both in levels and rates of growth. Our results show a process of convergence both in productivity
and wage distributions driven by a declining 50-10 percentile ratio. When decomposing the variance
in terms of within and between sectoral variations, the within sectoral component accounts for more
than 80% of the total variation. However, while the within sectoral dispersion in productivity shrinks,
the wage one remains almost stable. We then perform quantile regressions, trying to control for dif-
ferent wage-productivity relations over the quantiles of the distributions. And we further refine the
analysis with correlated random effects and fixed effects quantile estimations to explicitly account for
the panel structure of our dataset.
A few results are quite robust under different estimation strategies. First, throughout the impres-
sive Chinese economic miracle, elasticities of real wages to productivities – that is the ratios of rates
of variations of the former to the latter – are always positive both under pooled and longitudinal esti-
mates, both at firm- and sectoral-levels. Second, such elasticities are remarkably low, and decreasing
in many sub-periods since the late seventies. The foregoing stylised facts, taken together, suggest that
China has never experienced a pure Lewis-Marx stage of early industrialization whereby an “unlimited
supply of labour” has kept wages at some subsistence level with labour productivity exponentially
growing. The low elasticities of wages to productivity are plausibly the consequence of the massive
flow of migrant workers from the rural areas to the coasts, somewhat resembling the early phase of
the English Industrial Revolution with the pattern of enclosure in the country-side and massive mi-
grations to the industrial towns. However, even in the manufacturing sector, the distribution of gains
from the impressive labour productivity growth appears to be markedly uneven. Recall that our evi-
dence suggests that, at best, a 1% increase in productivity translates into 0.3% increase in real wages,
which is markedly lower than in developed countries. Finally, third, governance institutions seem to
matter a lot. So, most ownership types display (very low) firm-specific, positive elasticities of real
wages to productivities. Conversely, State-owned enterprises show higher elasticities and exert an
equalizing role, with a declining pass-through along the wage distribution.
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Table A.1: Aggregation of the 23 registration categories. Source: Jefferson et al. (2003), Annex I.
Code Ownership category Code Registration status
1 State-owned 110 State-owned enterprises
141 State-owned jointly operated enterprises
151 Wholly State-owned companies
2 Collective-owned 120 Collective-owned enterprises
130 Shareholding cooperatives
142 Collective jointly operated enterprises
3 Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan-invested 210 Overseas joint ventures
220 Overseas cooperatives
230 Overseas wholly-owned enterprises
240 Overseas shareholding limited companies
4 Foreign-invested
Joint ventures
310 Foreign joint ventures
320 Foreign cooperatives
340 Foreign shareholding limited companies
Foreign MNCs 330 Foreign wholly-owned enterprises
5 Shareholding 159 Other limited liability companies
160 Shareholding limited companies
6 Private 171 Private wholly-owned enterprises
172 Private cooperatives enterprises
173 Private limited liability companies
174 Private shareholding companies
7 Other domestic 143 State-collective jointly operated enterprises
149 Other jointly operated enterprises
190 Other enterprises
The (residual) seventh category is not analyzed separately.
Table A.2: Number of firms (dataset after cleaning, and excluding firms’ ownership belonging to category 7 -
Other domestic ownership type)
Ownership types 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
State-owned 29171 31302 25955 21127 17893 13952 10245 9537 8083 5753
Collective-owned 41271 45231 40873 35738 32074 26870 19598 19495 16749 14115
HMT-invested 12082 14153 14807 16844 17896 19662 24253 26332 27964 26469
Foreign-invested 8595 9858 10661 12059 13500 16021 24521 27053 29599 28424
Shareholding 7867 11162 14259 19689 23292 26749 36281 41555 45956 43485
Private-owned 7981 12715 18055 31633 43318 57716 95746 112722 136294 128890
Total 106967 124421 124610 137090 147973 160970 210644 236694 264645 247136
A. Further descriptive statistics
B. Further quantile estimates by ownership types
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Table A.3: Total number of employees (dataset after cleaning, and excluding firms’ ownership belonging to
category 7 - Other domestic ownership type). Unit: millions
Ownership types 1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
State-owned 18.35 17.93 15.01 12.15 10.12 8.48 5.65 6.01 5.25 4.55
Collective-owned 10.14 10.40 9.19 7.50 6.67 5.53 3.39 3.45 2.95 2.62
HMT-invested 3.84 4.40 4.66 5.12 5.64 6.74 8.04 9.20 10.11 9.93
Foreign-invested 2.65 2.98 3.33 3.78 4.27 5.33 7.77 9.20 10.50 11.08
Shareholding 4.39 5.69 7.00 8.75 9.87 10.72 12.04 13.77 14.59 14.28
Private-owned 1.26 2.07 3.01 4.92 6.67 9.17 12.75 15.64 18.25 18.17
Total 40.63 43.46 42.20 42.22 43.25 45.98 49.63 57.28 61.65 60.63
Figure A.1: Distribution of the number of firms in manufacturing across regions in China. Source: our elabora-
tion on CMM.
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Table A.4: Elasticities by ownership types.
Ownership types 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1999-2007
State-owned 1.70 1.50 -1.68 2.16 0.67 1.11 3.05 1.11 0.51 1.14
Collective-owned 0.96 1.41 0.06 0.72 0.61 26.20 0.61 1.23 1.15 0.92
HMT-invested 1.25 1.67 -0.36 0.63 3.43 0.67 5.07 1.28 1.09 1.40
Foreign-invested 0.99 0.81 -1.67 1.57 0.54 0.48 4.45 0.97 0.95 1.05
Shareholding 0.95 1.05 0.07 0.74 0.66 2.06 0.92 1.01 0.63 0.84
Private-owned 0.66 0.97 0.38 0.66 0.49 6.83 0.73 0.80 0.78 0.80
Figure A.2: Wage/productivity 90-10 ratio by year, all manufacturing firms by six major ownership types.
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Figure A.3: Wage at the top (90-50 ratio) versus bottom (50-10 ratio) of the distribution by year, all manufactur-
ing firms by six major ownership types.
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Figure A.4: Productivity at the top (90-50 ratio) versus bottom (50-10 ratio) of the distribution by year, all
manufacturing firms by six major ownership types.
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Figure A.5: Share of within-sector wage [left] and labour productivity [right] dispersion by ownership types.
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Note: pooling all firms in manufacturing sector, deviation from the 4-digit sectoral labour-weighted mean.
Source: our elaboration on CMM.
Figure B.6: Model in level - CREM by ownership types.
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Distribution of quantile regression coefficients across four-digit sectors for each ownership type. Quantile re-
gression estimation of equation (4). The coefficient on log- labour productivity reported for the 0.05, 0.10, 0.25,
0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95 quantiles. Note: keeping dataset with observations> 160. The dashed line is the median
of the distribution of OLS estimates.
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Figure B.7: Model in level - FE by ownership types.
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Distribution of quantile regression coefficients across four-digit sectors for each ownership type. Quantile re-
gression estimation of equation (4). The coefficient on log- labour productivity reported for the 0.05, 0.10, 0.25,
0.50, 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95 quantiles. Note: keeping dataset with observations> 160. The dashed line is the median
of the distribution of OLS estimates.
Figure B.8: Quantile regression coefficients by ownership types.
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Quantile regression estimation of equation (15) pooling all 4-digit sectors, including 2-digit sectoral dummies.
The solid line is the OLS estimate. Bootstrapped standard errors with 90% confidence band.
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Figure B.9: Quantile regression coefficients by ownership types.
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Quantile
Private−owned
Quantile regression estimation of equation (16) pooling all 4-digit sectors, including 2-digit sectoral dummies.
The solid line is the OLS estimate. Bootstrapped standard errors with 90% confidence band.
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